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A critical question in the study of human perception is whether information in visual working memory is stored as complete, bound-up objects, or as collections of un-bound visual
features. Here I test whether the location of an object is a fundamental feature that is always stored when anything else about the object is, or if it is possible to store other features
of an object even with no memory for where it was seen. New experimental paradigms
and mathematical models were developed to estimate how many colors, how many locations, and how many color-location conjunctions could be stored. Results across three
experiments indicate that about one color is stored with no corresponding memory for
where it was seen. This memory is not due to verbal encoding, and does not simply reflect
noisy location memory. This free-floating feature greatly constrains theories of how visual
information is stored in memory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

As you go about your day, immense amounts of information is collected by your senses.
This amount of information is so immense that it is more than we could ever hope to
process fully. Your visual system alone takes in 1,250,000,000 bytes of information every
second (Raichle, 2010). Yet some marvel allows for this information to be sorted and
processed by your brain, culminating in your perception of your environment. However,
it is easy to fail to appreciate that you are not drowning in this large quantity of visual
information. For example, in Figure 1 you see a mug on a desk. You had no trouble
looking at it and identifying that the object on the desk is indeed a white mug. You could
talk about how the handle is on the right, or even imagine what the mug might look like
if it were painted blue. It is easy to recognize the features of an object, and our visual
working memory allows us to imagine transformations of those features (Logie, 2003).
However, the ability to manipulate singular features does not change the impression that
our visual experience of the world suggests a collection of bound objects.
Your brain takes in all the information provided by your senses and processes the features
so that you perceive a scene of distinct objects and not a collection of features. Each
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Figure 1. Perception Occurs at the Object-Level.
It is a mug. But why do we perceive a white mug and not whiteness and the
curves of the mug and where the mug is in space.

distinct object is defined in many ways, including its shape, color, and unique location in
space. That we recognize and manipulate individual features of items but perceive items as
whole objects has caused a line of studies debating the contents of visual working memory.

Visual Working Memory
Visual working memory is a system in which we store and manipulate visual information
(Logie, 2003). In this system, information can be maintained and manipulated for short
periods of time. Visual working memory represents all the items you perceive and allows
you to interact with the visual world around you. It connects us to the world and allows us
to do many activities such as read, drive, or find a mug to pour coffee. Beyond basic object
recognition, you can identify different characteristics of an object. You know that the mug
in Figure 1 is white, and where it is in space. That you can identify and manipulate features
2

of mental representations independently does not change the fact that when you look at the
mug, you do not naturally perceive the independent features of whiteness, mug-ness, and
on-the-desk-ness, but a white mug on a desk. Each feature of the item is present when
you perceive it, and the brain’s processing of features into an object seems effortless and
natural. That we can manipulate the features of our mental representations independently
but do not naturally perceive visual features independently, raises a fundamental question:
is working memory full of whole bound objects, or independent collections of features
(colors, shapes, and locations)? Although answering this question has been the target of
research for decades (Awh et al., 2007; Dowd & Golomb, 2019;Huang, 2015; Luck &
Vogel, 1997; Woodman et al., 2003; Zhang & Luck, 2008), there is still little consensus
regarding how information is stored in visual working memory.
Two major theories of how information is stored in visual working memory have emerged.
The following sections examine these prominent theories of information storage. The goal
of this thesis is to test these theories by determining if location is always present in visual
working memory representations.

Strong-Object Hypothesis
The idea that all visual information is represented in visual working memory as cohesive
objects is known as the strong-object hypothesis (Luck & Vogel, 1997). That we perceive
a white-mug as a white-mug and not a collection of whiteness, and mug-ness seems to
support this theory. The strong-object hypothesis predicts, that the blue line at the right
of Figure 2 is encoded into memory as a fully integrated object, a “horizontal blue line at
3

the right-most position”, not an independent collection of features (i.e., blueness, lineness,
and horizontalness in the right-most location).
Displays like Figure 2 are often used in visual working memory experiments. In a task created by Luck and Vogel (1997), participants were exposed to such displays for a short time
before it is replaced with a blank screen for a short retention interval. After the retention
interval, participants determined whether there was a change between the study display
and a display shown at test. Accuracy on this task reveals how much of the information
from the display a participant held in memory. Luck and Vogel (1997) asked participants
to detect changes to either just the color, just the orientation, or both the color and orientation of such displays. When asked to remember only a single target feature, participants
could report the target feature of about four items. Critically, when asked to remember all
the features of an item, participants could still multiple features of four items with a fair
degree of accuracy. The results suggest that working memory has a limit on the number of
objects one can store, but not the total number of features per object. This result was taken
as evidence that items are represented in working memory represents items as cohesive
objects, not conglomerations of independent features.
Following Luck and Vogel (1997), several researchers have attempted to conceptually
replicate their findings. Other results lend support for the strong-object hypothesis. (Awh
et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2011; Logie et al., 2011; Zhang & Luck, 2008) For example, by
examining the influence of changes to task-irrelevant features Gao et al. (2011) found that
even if participants did not attend to a feature, changing that feature between study and

4

Figure 2. An Example Memory Display.
A classic example of a memory display used in visual memory experiments.

test lowered participants ability to detect a change in task-relevant feature dimension. The
finding is evidence that participants are encoding all of the features of an item, including features they have no motivation to encode (Gao et al., 2011). This finding directly
supports the idea that all the features of an item are encoded into a single object-level
representation. This idea is a core tenant of the strong-object hypothesis.
However,several studies have found results contrary to Luck and Vogel’s (1997) conclusions, often suggesting that representations in working memory are feature-based (Fougnie
& Alvarez, 2011; Heuer & Schubo, 2016; Huang, 2015; Sanada et al., 2015; Wang et al.,
2016; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). The following section details a theory of memory representation that proposes to account for the results which have been interpreted as evidence
of object-based representations as well as results which have been interpreted as evidence
of feature-based representations.

5

Weak-Object Hypothesis
The antithesis to the idea that all items are stored in visual working memory as fully
bound objects is the idea that each feature of an item is maintained independently of any
other feature of an item. According to this strong-feature-theory, the horizontal-blueline in Figure 2, would be held as a series of independent feature representations. The
item’s blueness, lineness, horizontalness, and “in the right-most location-ness” would each
be stored in a separate feature-based representation. Research investigating the theory
that features are represented independently, has found an effect of grouping features into
objects (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Heuer & Schubo, 2016; Huang, 2015; Sanada et al.,
2015;Wang et al., 2016; Woodman & Vogel, 2008).
Because there is evidence that recall is affected by both the number of items and the number of features per item, one theory has combined the idea that representations are objectbased and the idea there are feature-based representations (Olson & Jiang, 2002). For
example, Olson and Jiang (2002) theorized that visual working memory representations
are comprised of groups of features. The group of features is created by a process that
finds ‘shortcuts’ to reduce the difficulty of maintaining the representation. This theory that
working memory representations are comprised of features grouped together by similarity
is known as the weak-object hypothesis. The shortcuts that bind features together are created by a process called chunking. Features with familiar, similar, or shared properties are
chunked together in one representation.

6

The distinguishing factor between chunk-based representations and object representations
is the adaptivity and compressability of chunks. Object-based representations have semifixed content, each representation encapsulating all of the features of one item. The
systematic way the contents of object-based representations are ’selected’ contrasts with
the dynamic ’selection’ that occurs during the encoding of chunk-based representations.
Chunk-based representations are adaptive in that they can encode information differently
based on how attention is distributed. They can be structured to contain information in a
variety of ways. A chunk may contain information from a single region in space, mimicking an object-based representation, or that same chunk is capable of maintaining several
features of an array based on familiarity or similarity. This chunk-based representation is
different than an object-based representation because an object-based representation will
always include all of the features of the item where as a chunk is comprised of an attention
guided selection of the features from an array. This means that the horizontal blue line
in Figure 2 could be represented as a vast assortment of possible combination representations, or not represented at all. The chunk-based representations may or may not include
blueness, lineness, horizontalness, and/or its position. If spatial attention was the ’binding
feature’ these features may all be grouped in a way that allowed them to occupy a chunk in
memory, this chuck would mimic an object based representation (Olson and Jiang, 2002).
If participants were shown an array such as Figure 3, it is expected that participants would
be able to remember more of that array than participants presented with an array such as
in Figure 2. That participants are able to remember more group-able items, like Figure
3, might seem obvious, but the importance of this phenomenon is that it demonstrates
7

the flexibility of the mental representations in visual working memory. The ability to
chunk allows for the process to form chunk-based representations of features with shared
properties. This process happens when patterns are recognized, such as in Figure 3, or
between similar features that may exist across items, such as if a participant noticed the
lines at the top and bottom of Figure 2 were about the same orientation. However, a claim
of the weak-object hypothesis chunking is capable of finding similarities and creating a
representation of a single item. Even when the features of items in an array do not have
any obvious way to create a memory shortcut between items, chunking is still able to affect
the binding of features within an item. In particular, one property common to all of the
features of an item is their shared location. This shared location can be used to group the
features of an item into a single chunk-based representation.
Many studies have found results that support the use of chunking mechanisms in visual
working memory taking independent feature representations and encoding them together
as weak-objects (Fougnie et al., 2013; Hardman & Cowan, 2014; Wood, 2011). Both
the strong-object hypothesis and the weak-object hypothesis are seen in research today.
Location is a critical feature that can be used to distinguish between these hypotheses.
This thesis was designed to test participants’ memory of location and spatial bindings to
distinguish between these hypotheses.

The Role of Spatial Location in Visual Working Memory
The different ways the strong and weak-object hypothesis predict the formation of representations is especially evident when considering memory for the location of features.
8

Figure 3. An Easily Recalled Display.
An extreme example of a possible display that most participants would easily
remember. Looking at this display, it is natural to group all the items in the
display together into a single representation, making it easier to recall the
items in the display by using fewer resources.

The majority of the current work in the field does not evaluate the role location plays in
visual working memory representations; instead these studies often focus on features such
as color, orientation, or shape (Luck & Vogel, 1997). However spatial attention plays a
key role in the formation of representations (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). The influence of
spatial attention in the formation of representations situates an items location to be a crucial feature in the representation of that item. The strong-object hypothesis predicts that
participants’ memory of unbound features (i. e. colors etc. ) should be equal to their memory of features bound to space. Estimating both participant’s capacity for features bound
to space and unbound features allows for a strong-test of the strong-object hypothesis.
The strong-object hypothesis predicts visual working memory representations include all
of the features of an item, including that item’s location. For example, you can not see
the white mug in Figure 1 without also perceiving where it is. The strong-object hy9

pothesis makes these same assumptions about the ideas held in memory. In contrast, the
weak-object hypothesis predicts that location is included only in a subset of representations. The current series of studies to asked questions like, is it necessary that all visual
representations are tied to space, and is there a possibility that some representations are
free-floating and exist without location information? It was predicted that the results of
the current studies would support the idea that the strong-object hypothesis was incorrect
and instead produce evidence of a free-floating feature representation.
Unfortunately, studying location is not as straightforward as studying other features such
as color or orientation. Location is unique because you can not control for it in the same
manner as you can for other features. All of the stimuli presented to participants can be
controlled to have the same orientation or color but you can not show multiple stimuli
at the same location without having them interfere with one another. The requisite that
stimuli can not share a location without interference makes counterbalancing and cueing
visual information is uniquely challenging.
Rajsic and Wilson (2014) studied memory for item location by investigating participants’
ability to recall location when probed with the color of an item, and compared that with
participants’ recall of color when the location of an item was used as a probe. Rajsic and
Wilson (2014) found that when given a color cue, participants were likely to report location
accurately. However, when location was used as a probe, participants were much worse
at reporting the corresponding color. They interpreted participants superior performance
when reporting a location cue over reporting color with a location cue to indicate that peo-
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ple nest feature representations into automatically encoded locations. Encoding features
into automatically encoded locations would imply the use of chunk-based representations.
In a similar study, participants were given always cued with a color and asked to respond
with its location. An analysis of trials in which a subject performed inaccurately revealed
that participants often answered as if they were indicating a location at which another color
had been presented (Schneegans & Bays, 2016). This finding further supports Rajsic and
Wilson’s (2014) conclusion that features like color are automatically encoded as nested
within spatial locations.
Kovacs and Harris (2019), found that when participants failed to recall the location of an
item, they also failed to recall the item’s color the majority of the time. However, if a participant failed to recall the color of an item, the participant could often recall the location
of that item. While the results of this study do not speak to the form representations take,
they do suggest that location information is crucial in the binding process. Kovacs and
Harris (2019) were not the first to put forward this idea. The idea that binding was reliant
on spatial attention has been tested by studies over the last thirty years since Treisman and
Gelade (1980) put forth the theory and conducted several experiments demonstrating that
spatial information is crucial in the process of creating memory representations.
If you looked at Figure 2 and saw a yellow horizontal line at the right-most position and
an oblique blue line above it, this would be an example of a miss-binding. In this example,
you have miss-bound the colors of these two items, swapping them. If participants are
miss-binding items so that features are recalled at spatial locations other than the locations
11

they were presented at, this would also explain a pattern of findings found in these studies.
Many of the ideas in Treisman and Gelade (1980) align with the propositions of the weakobject hypothesis.
One reason the role of location plays such a central role comes from the structure of our
visual system itself. Every neuron in our visual system only receives information from a
limited portion of visual space. This correspondence between visual space and the neurons
in the visual cortex is called retinotopic mapping. Because the neurons in the visual system
are all spatially mapped, when these neurons relay information about what you are perceiving, they automatically encode location information with it. Recent research supports
the idea that spatial information is automatically encoded. Foster et al. (2017) conducted
a study using a task that had no requirement or incentive for participants to remember the
location of items. However, brain activity indicated that participants recalled location information when they had no external motivation to do so. Information about where an item
is automatically bound to information about what that item is. Additional support for the
idea location is automatically encoded comes from a study which used overlapping items
to manipulate the number of spatial locations their items occupied (Lee & Chun, 2001).
The results of the study showed that there was no effect of the number of spatial positions
on participants’ memory of the presented items. That the number of spatial locations was
not a significant influence on participant’s memory was taken as evidence in support of the
idea that encoding location happens automatically and does not require memory resources.
If location is automatically encoded and does not require additional resources to store in
memory, this would imply that additional information is being remembered without a cost
12

supporting the strong-object hypothesis. In the current thesis, the theory that location is
automatically encoded will be tested.

Current Studies
The goal of this thesis is to test a prediction of the strong-object hypothesis: that any remembered visual feature should be stored with its original location. If, alternatively, it is
possible to store features without their locations, then the strong-object hypothesis must
be incorrect. Multinomial-tree models were used to capture how many color-location conjunctions people can remember, as well as how many colors can be remembered regardless
of location. If more colors can be remembered than color-location conjunctions, then there
must be color information stored that does not have a location with it.
To separately measure the number of color-only and color-and-location representations,
new experiments and corresponding models were designed. These models provide estimates of: 1) color-location conjunctions, and 2) colors that may or may not have locations.
The current series of experiments was designed to investigate whether participants can recall the features of an item, without having bound those features to the stimulus’s spatial
location, or if the features of a stimulus are always and automatically bound to the location
at which they were presented. The design of these experiments allows for the comparison
across conditions to determine whether there is a difference in participants’ ability to recall
an item with or without the location.
The first experiment was designed to measure participants’ memory capacity for color,
location, as well as the color-and-location conjunction. Estimating how many color-only,
13

joint color-and-location and location-only representations a participant can hold allowed
for the comparison to determine whether participants held an equal amount of bound colorand-location representations as color representations or whether participants can recall
more colors than bound color-and-location conjunctions. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that people hold more color information than bound color-and-location information.
In Chapter III the source of this free-floating color information is examined, and the data
indicate that the extra color information can not be attributed to a verbal representation. In
Chapter IV analysis was done to examine the degree to which noise in memory of location
has the potential to suppress estimates of bound color-and-location representations. The
results indicated noise in memory did not eliminate the presence of a free-floating color.
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CHAPTER II
ACCESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF FREE-FLOATING FEATURES

The aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether participants can hold equal amounts of color
information as bound color-and-location information, or whether participants can recall
more colors than bound color-and-location conjunctions. Models were used to estimate capacity for a color-only condition, a color-and-location condition, and a location-only condition. Capacity indicates how much information a participant holds in memory (Cowan,
2001; Pashler, 1988; Rouder et al., 2011). The critical question is whether or not people
can feature information without the associated location information.
Participants were presented with displays of six colored circles. There were three conditions used to estimate the amount of color information, location information, and bound
color-and-location information that each participant can hold in memory. The color-only
condition tested participants’ memory for colors regardless of their locations. The colorand-location condition tested participants’ recollections of colors and their locations. The
location-only condition tested participants’ ability to recall the spatial configuration of the
array.
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The primary aim of this experiment was to test whether participants can hold equal amounts
of color information as bound color-and-location information. The crucial comparison is
done with two models fit to the color-only and color-and-location condition separately.
This allows a measure of capacity to be obtained that can be compared across conditions,
despite the differences.
There are two possible outcomes when the estimates of capacity in the color-only and
color-and-location are compared. Participants can either hold equal-amount color as colors bound to locations, or they can hold more colors than colors bound to their locations. It
is not possible for participants to hold more bound color-and-location representations than
color representations because whether you have the bound color information you by necessity have the color information. The same goes for location; you cannot have more colorand-location representations than locations represented. Even under the strong-objecthypothesis- which theorizes everything becomes bound- the amount of bound information cannot exceed the amount of feature information available for the feature with the
fewest number of representations. Instead the strong-object hypothesis predicts there are
an equal number of feature representations and bound feature-location representations in
memory. On the other side, the weak-object representations predicts there will be fewer
bound feature-location representations than bound feature representations in memory.
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Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Fifty-three undergraduate students at Mississippi State University (recruited using the
SONA system) participated in exchange for course credit. Three participants failed to
complete the experiment and were not analyzed. Participants were also excluded from
analysis if a binomial proportion that failed to show that they performed significantly
above chance, suggesting they failed to follow the instructions. Ten participants were
excluded from the analysis in Experiment 1 because they had performed at chance. Forty
participants remained for analysis.
]
A)

Color Only

B)

Color-and-Location

C)

Location Only

?

The three probes used in Experiment 1 each tested a different type of memory.
In the color-only condition (A) a 1 ◦ visual angle colored circle was presented
in the center of the screen. This colored circle in the center of the screen
prompted participants to respond whether that color had been in the study
display or not. In the color-and-location condition (B) a 1 ◦ visual angle colored circle was presented in one of the locations from the study array. In the
color-and-location condition participants answered whether the color shown
was originally presented at that location in the array. In the location-only
condition (C) a question mark inside of a diamond was presented in one of
the locations the stimuli could have occupied. The presentation of this probe
elicited participants to respond whether there had been any color shown at that
location in the study display.
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Table 1
Conditions in Experiments 1 & 2.
Question
(1) Was this color in the display?
(2) Was this color at this location in the display?
(3) Was there anything at this location in the display?

Requires
Color
X
X

Requires
Location
X
X

Stimulus and Design
Stimuli were presented on an 18-inch monitor using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Kleiner
et al., 2007). The study stimuli consisted of colored circles presented to participants were
1◦ visual angle in size presented around an invisible circle (6◦ radius). Six study stimuli
were shown at one of 8 possible locations around the invisible circle. The colors were
chosen without replacement from eight possible colors consisting of black, white, red,
green, blue, yellow, orange, and purple.
Three questions were used to test participants’ memory for different types of information. Table 1 shows which conditions tapped which types of information, depictions of the
question probes can be seen in Figure II. The three probes were intermixed and counterbalanced with test trials probing features from the study display vs test trials probing features
not in the study display throughout the entire experiment creating a 2x3 within-subject
design. Intermixing the presentation of the probes motivated participants to attempt to
remember both the location and the color information throughout the experiment.
On same trials, the test probes were features from the study display. In the color-only
condition a color from the study display was shown at test. In the color-and-location
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condition,the probe on a same trial would be a color shown at that location it had been
in the study display. In the location-only condition, the probe on a same trial would be
a question mark at a location a color was shown at in the study display. On these trials,
participants should indicate no that/those features had not changed from study display.
If participants correctly identified the probe had not changed, this was termed a hit. If
participants responded incorrectly on a same, this was termed a miss.
On change trials, the test probes were features not present in the study display. In the
color-only condition a color not presented in the study display was shown at test. In the
color-and-location condition, the probe on a same trial would be a color not presented in
the study display at a location another color had been in the study display. In the locationonly condition, this would mean that a color was not shown at that location in the study
display. On these trials, participants should indicate no that/those features were not present
in the array and there was a change in the stimulus. If participants responded incorrectly
on a change trial having answered that the probe had been in the array when it was not
they reciebed a correct rejection.

Procedure
Figure 4 shows the time structure of a trial. Each trial started with a fixation cross. The
initial period of fixation was followed by a study display of six colored circles shown for
500 ms. Following the study period, there was a 1000 ms retention interval. The retention
interval was followed by the presentation of one of three possible test probes depicted in
Figure II. One of the three possible test probes was shown until the participant responded.
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500 ms
Self-Paced
1000 ms

Feedback

500 ms

Test

1000 ms

Retention
Study

Fixation
Figure 4. The trial structure used in Experiments 1 &2.

Each trial began with a fixation cross displayed for 1000 ms followed by a
study display consisting of six colored circles presented for 500 ms. Participants then held this information for 1000 ms during the retention interval
before the participants saw one of three probes. After answering, participants
were given feedback for 500ms before the next trial.

After participants responded whether the probe had or had not changed, they received
performance feedback (500ms), followed by a 1000 ms inter-trial interval before the next
trial began. Each participant completed 20 practice trials and 300 data collection trials.

Analysis
The data consisted of two measures, the rate of responding change when the item changed
(the hit rate), and the rate of responding change when the item was the same as the study
item (the false alarm rate). Models are used the hit and false alarm rates are used to
estimate a participant’s memory capacity in each question condition.
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The color-only and location-only conditions are different from the color-and-location condition because instead of participants having to report information about one item in the
array, participants need information from each item in the array or they will be guessing.
The increase in guessing in the location-only and color-only conditions compared to the
color-and-location condition, leads to the location-only and color-only condition having
a higher false alarm rate. This increased false alarm rate on “change” trials is the distinguishing factor of the forced guessing model.The different question conditions required
different types of information to be answered correctly. These differences can cause differences in guessing strategy. Different models were used to account for those differences.
Possible Rejection Model. In the color-and-location condition, when presented with a
probe a participant always has the chance to use their knowledge of the study display
to determine whether the probed feature(s) was presented in the study array. Because
participants have the chance to recall information that conflicts with the presented probe,
they can reject the probe in this condition without guessing. The partial report model
(Cowan, 2001) estimates capacity under these conditions. It is possible to the model to fit
the data in the color-and-location condition, the remapped model will be referred to as the
possible rejection model.
In the color-and-location condition and location-only, participants are asked to report information about one item in the array. Cowan (2001) developed a model to describe participant’s behavior on tasks such as a partial-report change detection task. In the typical
partial-report task participants are shown a display of study items. One item is singled
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out, and participants have to identify whether this item changed. In the color-and-location
condition, one color is singled out by location and participants identify whether this color
changed (Figure IIB). The possible rejection model is depicted in of Figure 5 (bottom).
Each branch of the model represents a potential behavior a participant could exhibit on a
trial. Each branch ends in a type of response. By assigning a variable and its reciprocal
to each divergent path, it is possible to evaluate the probability a person will achieve any
one outcome by adding the parameters on the branches leading to that outcome. Summing across identical outcomes provides the overall probability the data occur given the
estimated parameters. The total probability of a hit (h) is:

h = P + (1 − P )(1 − u)

(1)

where p is the probability that the probed item was in a participants’ memory, u is a
participant’s bias to guess change.
On change trials, a correct rejection can come about in two ways. Participants received a
correct rejection when they recalled the color that was present at the probed location, they
will reject the probe to get a correct rejection (with the probability p). Alternatively, if a
participant can not remember what color was originally presented at the probed location,
they must guess. A participant can guess that the feature was presented in the study display
and get a correct rejection or guess that the feature change from the study display and get
a false alarm (with the probability u). The probability of a false alarm (f ) is given by:
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f = (1 − P )u.

(2)

The rate of false alarms is equivalent to participants bias to guess change times one minus
the probability that any one of the probed features is in memory. In Figure 5 when participants were asked “Was color at this location in the array” and were shown a probe that
was the same as in the study display, the participants could have recalled that color at that
location (with the probability p) and answered that the array had not changed. In this case,
the outcome would be a hit. However, if a participant did not recall whether the color was
presented at the probed location (with probability 1 − p), the participant must guess. They
could guess “same” and get a miss or guess “change” (with probability u) and get a hit.
The Forced Guessing Model.
Recalling information from the array to reject the probe does not work the same way in
forced-guessing model as it does in the possible-rejection model. In the forced-guessing
model, participants can correctly answer “same” trials the same way as in the possiblerejection model. However, when a “change trial” occurs in a task that can be estimated
by the forced-guessing model participants’ knowledge of the display is not sufficient to
be able to determine whether the presented color was or was not in the study display.
The whole report model (Pashler, 1988) estimates capacity under these conditions. With
minor adjustments this model can be fit to the color-only and location-only conditions.
For participants to answer the question “Was color in the array?” on a change trial, they
would need to recall all six colors from the study display to be certain that the color being
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shown was not in the array. Because memory capacity is limited and most people have
a capacity of about three items, they have no way of excluding the changed color as one
of the possible colors that were forgotten (Pashler, 1988). That participants are unable
to recall all the necessary information to reject indicates they must resort to guessing on
every trial on which they are presented with a probe from outside the study display. That
participants are forced to guess is the defining aspect of the model used to estimate capacity
in the the color-only and location-only conditions.
Pashler (1988) developed the whole-report model to account for the increase in guess rate
on a task when participants cannot always recall all of the information necessary to determine whether there was a change. This model was originally intended to be applied
to a whole-report change detection task in which a second array is shown after the study
display and participants need to identify whether any of the items in the display changed.
This task resembles the color-only condition in this experiment. In both a traditional whole
report task and the color-only condition, to get the correct answer on half of trials participants must know all of the information in the display to exclude the possibility that the
information presented at test has changed from the information presented in the study display. In the color-only condition of the current task, whether participants are presented
with a “change” trial they are forced to guess whether there was a change because they
can not hold all of the necessary information in memory to rule out the possibility that the
probed color was one of the colors presented but not in memory. The resemblance in these
tasks allowed for the model that Pashler (1988) designed for the whole-report paradigm to
be used to fit the data in the color-only condition.
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The forced guessing model for change trials can be seen in the bottom right quadrant of
Figure 5. Because the knowledge needed to answer correctly in this condition is assumed
to exceed the memory capacity of participants, there is no branch where participants can
rely on information in memory to answer the question correctly. This only option in these
circumstances is to guess. Once again, a participant can either guess same and get a
correct rejection or guess change (u) and get a false alarm. In the forced guessing model,
the probability of a false alarm is f :

f = u,

(3)

h = P + (1 − P )(1 − u)

(4)

and a hit is calculated as:

Fitting the Models.
Maximum likelihood estimation was used to fit these models to the data collected. In this
approach, parameters are found that maximize the likelihood of the data given the model.
The likelihood of the hit and false alarm data follows the binomial distribution.

 
n r
L=
p (1 − r)n−r
k

(5)

In this equation, L is the likelihood given the number of trials (n) and the number of
responses (r) (hits or false alarms). The log-likelihood was calculated based on the total
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Was (color) at
this location in
the array?

Was (color) in
the array?

Same Trials
A

Hit (No)

p

1-p

u
1-u

C

Hit (No)
Hit (No)

p

1-p

Miss (Yes)

u
1-u

Change Trials
B
Not in
u
Memory 1-u
D

Miss (Yes)
Hit (No)

Correct Rejection(No)

p
1-P

False Alarm (Yes)
Correct Rejection(No)

u
1-u

False Alarm (Yes)
Correct Rejection(No)

Figure 5. Model Implemented in Experiment 1.
The model for the location-only and color-only conditions (top) differs from
the color-and-location condition (bottom), in how responses arise in change
trials (right). However, the models are identical on same trials (left).

number of hits (H) and, the total number of false alarms (F ), the possible number of times
they could have given that response (N change , N same ), as well as the hit rate (h) and false
alarm rate (f ) predicted by the models:

llhit = H ∗ log(h) + (Nchange − H) ∗ log(1 − h)

(6)

llf a = F ∗ log(f ) + (Nsame − F ) ∗ log(1 − f )

(7)

The liklihoods llhit and llf a were then summed and the Nelder Mead minimization algorithm (Nelder &Mead, 1965) was applied. To estimate memory capacity the parameters
p (the probability that item was present in memory) and u (a participant’s bias to choose
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“change” while guessing) were incrementally adjusted to to maximize the likelihood that
both H and F occurred in the data.

Results
It is possible to compare the hit and false alarm rates across conditions to see differences
between the color-only and color-and-location conditions. Figure 6 shows the hit and false
alarm rates obtained from the data. Participants’ hit rate is nearly identical between the
color-only and color-and-location conditions. However, the false alarm rate in the coloronly condition is higher than in the color-and-location condition. The lower false alarm
rate in the color-and-location condition corresponds with models’ prediction that the colorand-location condition would have a lower false alarm rate because this condition enabled
participants to reject false probes using information in memory which they were unable to
in the color-only condition.
The critical question is whether participants have fewer representations of bound colorand-locations than representations of color alone when they are trying to remember all
possible information on all of the trials. Comparing capacity estimates across conditions
measures whether participants held equal amounts of color information and color-andlocation information in visual working memory. Figure 7 shows the average estimates
of memory capacity for each question condition. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA
yielded a significant effect of question type on memory capacity (F(1,124) = 32.87, p
< 0.001) A t-test reveals that capacity in the location-only condition (M = 5.04, SEM =
0.286) was significantly higher than the capacity in both the color-only (M = 3.91, SEM
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Figure 6. Experiment 1 Hit and False Alarm Rates.
Memory Capacity in each question condition across all participants. The error
bars represent the standard error in each condition.

= 0.229) and color-and-location (M = 2.79, SEM = 0.172) conditions (t(41) = 11.18, p
< 0.001). This is evidence that participants’ capacity for spatial locations exceeds their
capacity for colors. Critically the color-only condition was significantly higher than the
color-and-location condition (t(41) = 6.22, p < 0.001). This result suggests there is more
color information in memory than color-and-location information. This result suggests
that participants could hold three colors, but only two color-and-location conjunctions in
memory.
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Figure 7. Capacity Estimates from Experiment 1.
Memory Capacity in each question condition. The error bars represent the
standard error in each condition.

Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that participants held approximately one more color
representation in memory than representations of color-and-location conjunctions. This
difference implies that there is a memory for which participants know of an item, but lack
any memory of its previous location. That participants hold a color in memory without
binding that color to it’s location is evidence against the strong-object hypothesis’s assertion that all the features of an object are bound together.
There are several other possible explanations for why participants hold more color information than color-and-location conjunctions in visual working memory. One reason
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there may have been a lower capacity in the color-and-location stems from m Baddeley
and Hitch’s (1994) model of working memory. This model includes separate visual and
separate visual and auditory storage mechanisms.
It had been suggested that participants can offload information from the visual memory
into the verbal store (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). To stop participants from re-coding visual
information as verbal participants are often asked to repeat phrases over and over again
in order to occupy verbal memory during the experiment. This repetition of words, called
articulatory suppression (Murray, 1967), is presumed to hold up the resources of verbal
memory and prevent the transfer of information from the visual to verbal memory. (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). One recent study intended to investigate the tendency to re-code
visual information into the verbal store (Sense et al., 2017). In this study participants
completed a partial-report change detection task while repeating the phrase “ta-da” on a
portion of trials. The results did not support a difference in performance between trials
where there was suppression and trials were there was not. However the nature of the
whole-report task used in the color-only condition may be better suited for the use of verbal information because partial report tasks often require spatial memory which is hard to
encode verbally. As there is no requirement for spatial memory in the color-only condition, it may be more practical to encode this information verbally then it would be to store
conjunctive information. The increased ability to store color-only representations verbally
would explain why the capacity in the color-only condition was larger than the capacity in
color-and-location condition.
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CHAPTER III
FREE-FLOATING FEATURES VS. VERBAL REPRESENTATIONS

In Experiment 1, participants could hold approximately one more color representation
than bound color-and-location representations. The goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether participants were verbally coding color information into memory results
form which would raise the measure of capacity in the color-only condition but not the
color-and-location. Participants completed part of the working memory experiment under
articulatory suppression, which should prevent participants from verbally coding colors
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). Verbal coding is prevented by having participants continuously
repeat some word or phrase out loud while completing the visual working memory task.
If the additional color information in participants’ memory is being held verbally, then
articulatory suppression should prevent participants from verbally coding colors, resulting
in an equal amount of color and color-and-location information in memory.
Experiment 2 tested the possibility that the higher capacity in the color-only condition than
color-and-location condition was caused by a verbal representation in verbal memory. In
Experiment 2, some of the participants completed the task under articulatory suppression
and others completed the task without undergoing suppression. If a verbal representa-

31

tion is driving there to be greater amounts of color than color-and-location information,
then implementing articulatory suppression should occupy verbal memory and eliminate
the possibility of additional verbal representation, and capacity should be similar for the
color-only and color-and-location conditions. Finding a difference between articulatory
suppression conditions would indicate that the “extra” color representation in working
memory is not coded verbally but freely floating in visual working memory, unbound to a
location.

Experiment 2
Methods
Participants
In Experiment 2A, 10 participants completed 3 one-hour sessions each and were paid $30.
In Experiment 2B eleven participants were recruited. One subject did not complete the
experiment, and the remaining 10 participants participated in 3 one hour sessions and were
paid $30 each. Some participants participated,in both 2A and 2B. A binomial proportion
showed that all participants performed above chance, so all participants were included in
analysis.

Stimulus and Design
Experiment 2A was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. One difference was that the set size was varied between trials. Presenting set sizes two, four and,
six allowed for a more complex model to be fit. Experiment 2A was designed to replicate
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the results of Experiment 1 but set sizes was manipulated with set sizes of two, four, and
six being presented. Collecting data at multiple set sizes was added to gather information
over a range of participant performance.Blocks in Experiment 2A were administered the
same as in Experiment 1. However, the blocks in Experiment 2B were shortened from 50
trials to 10 trials to give participants a chance to rest their voice more often, as not to cause
strain. Despite the difference in the number of blocks, there were 1242 trials collected per
participant in both Experiments 2A and 2B. In Experiment 2B, participants completed the
entire procedure under articulatory suppression. From the beginning to the end of each
block, a participant repetitively said “ta-da” out loud. To ensure compliance with suppression the experimenter sat in the room and marked that a participant articulated on a trial
by trial basis. The probes used in Experiment 2 represented the same questions asked in
Experiment 1, but the test probes were slightly altered to all be presented in the center of
the array (Figure 8). Presenting all the test probes in the center of the array eliminates any
possibility that a probe was overwriting participants’ memory of the probed item.

Procedure
The procedure in Experiment 2 was nearly identical to the procedure in Experiment 1.
Each trial began with a fixation cross, followed by a study display consisting of two, four,
or six colored circles. After a short retention interval participants and presented with one of
three probes. These probes ask one of three questions; “Was this color in the array?”, “Was
this color at this location in the array?”, and “Was any color at this location in the array?”
(probes depicted in Figure 8). Participants then respond to which they responded yes or
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Color Only

B)

Color-and-Location

C)

Location Only

Figure 8. Experiment 2 Probe Conditions
The probes used in Experiment 2 each tested a different type of memory. Table 1 shows which questions tapped which types of information. The probe
in Figure 8A was a colored circle 1◦ visual angle presented at the center of
the screen. When this probe was shown participants would report whether the
color had been presented in the study display. This tested participant’s memory of colors. The probe depicted in Figure 8B was a colored circle 1◦ visual
angle presented at the center of the screen with a colored line extending to at
one of the six locations previously shown in the display. This probe prompted
participants to respond whether that color was presented at that location in
the array, testing color-and location conjunctive memory. Figure 8C depicts
a black line extending from the center of the screen to at one of the eight
possible locations in the display. This probe prompts participants to respond
whether any of the colors was presented at the probed location. This condition
tests participants’ memory of location.

no to indicate whether the probed information was present in the display. Additionally,
participants in Experiment 2B had the opportunity to take a break every 10 trials to rest
their voice as they completed the experiment under articulatory suppression, by repeatedly
saying “ta-da”.

Analysis
The results of Experiments 2A and 2B were analyzed separately. As in Experiment 1,
two different models were used to estimate participant’s memory capacity in the different
question conditions. With multiple set sizes in Experiment 2 more complete models could
be used. One goal of the modeling in Experiment 2 was to account for the fact that per34

formance not only reflects failures in memory, but also failures in attention. The models
were similar to those used in the previous experiment, but included an additional parameter that accounted for lapses in attention absorbing variance in performance (Rouder et
al., 2011). When the set size is lower than memory capacity, then performance in this
condition should be perfect. In reality this is not what happens. Participants are not perfect; for example on a percentage of trials they will sneeze, or have been daydreaming.
Participant’s lack of attention to the display leads their performance to be less than perfect, which would otherwise restrict the estimates to be artificially decreased. The model
accounts for the rate of attentional lapses (a). Figure 9 depicts how a fits into the previous
model. The base structures of the trees (shown in black) depicted in Figure 9 resemble the
depiction of the model from the Experiment 1 shown in Figure 5. However, the addition
of the parameter a acts like a filter. On a portion of trials participants were not attending to
the task. When participants do not attend to the study display they show different guessing
behaviors than when they have some knowledge of the study display but not the probed
information in memory. By including this attentional parameter in the model it absorbs
variance in participants’ estimates of capacity giving a more reliable measure of capacity
and establishes two types of guessing behavior. In addition to the probability any one item
will be recalled (p), and participants’ bias to guess change when they know nothing about
the display (u) this more complex model estimates a third parameter, the percentage of
trials in which participants attended to the display (a).
When a participant does not attend to the trial then they do not know and are forced to
guess. Depending whether the probed information was in the study display participants
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could either guess correctly receiving a hit or correct rejection or guess incorrectly receiving a miss or a false alarm. Participants’ bias to guess change when they have not attended
to the study display and therefore have no memory to inform their choice is estimated
as u. On the other hand, participants’ do attend to the study array more often than not.
However, even when attending to the array they will not always know the answer. In these
cases participants have some information to inform the guess they make but are lacking
memory of the probed feature; informed guessing bias (g) is participants’ bias to guess
change when they had knowledge of the display. Informed guessing bias is not a free parameter but is calculated based on P (the chance any one of the stimuli from the display
is in memory) and u (uninformed guessing - participants’ bias to guess change when they
had no knowledge of the display because they did not attend).

g=

(1 − P ) ∗ u
(1 − P ) ∗ u( 1 − u)

(8)

When a participant does not attend to the trial then they do not know and are forced to
guess. Depending whether the probed information was in the study display participants
could either guess correctly receiving a hit or correct rejection or guess incorrectly receiving a miss or a false alarm. On trials where participants had attended to the trial the model
was that same as Experiment 1. In the Was this color at this location in the array? condition when the probed target was in the display, a participant can know the answer from
memory and get a hit or guess to receive a hit or a miss. Alternatively, when in this same
condition, participants attend but are given probe containing information not in the display,
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Figure 9. Models implemented in Experiment 2.
On the top is the model for the color-only and location only conditions, and
depicted on the bottom is the model for the color-and-location conjunction
condition. Just like the models used in Experiment 1 the model for the coloronly condition differs because when participants are presented with a external item not shown in the study display they are not able to say for certain
a color was not in the array because a participant would need to remember
more information (all six presented colors) than could be held in participants’
memory. Unlike Experiment 1 the models used in Experiment 2 have an additional parameter (a) (shown in red). The parameter a accounts for the rate
of attentional lapses.

they can get a correct rejection whether they know the answer or a correct rejection or a
false alarm if they guess.
This model is similar in the Was this color in the array? condition (Figure 9). In this
condition when a target was in the display a participant can know the answer and get a
hit. However, just as in the first experiment, when the probe is a color not in the study
display in the color-only and location-only conditions participants can not have enough
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information to answer that a color was not in the array so they are always guessing. The
hit and false alarm rates are derived from the expanded possible rejection model:




 
K
K
h=a
+ 1−
u + (1 − a) u
N
N

(9)

f = a [(1 − (1 − P ) ∗ u]) u] + (1 − a) u

(10)

For the forced guessing model the hit and false alarm rates are:
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g + (1 − a) u
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N

(11)

f = ag + (1 − a) u

(12)

These equations were used in concert with maximum likelihood estimation to establish
estimates of capacity (k), attention (a), and uninformed guessing bias (u).

Results
A two-way mixed-effects analysis of variance yielded a main effect for the question condition, (F(1, 56) = 54.12, p < 0.001). The main effect of articulatory suppression was not
significant, (F(1, 56) = 0.29, p = .58). However, the interaction between the question and
articulatory suppression conditions was significant, (F(1, 56) = 20.11, p < 0.001). The
presence of the interaction means that a the question conditions were affected differently
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by articulatory suppression. However, follow up comparisons suggest that capacity did not
significantly decline between the color-only conditions (t(13.8) = 1.62, p = 0.12), colorand-location conditions (t(14.35) = 0.78, p = 0.44) or location-only conditions (t(14.35) =
0.78, p = 0.5) with the presence articulatory suppression. There still are several possible
explanations for the interaction between question and articulatory suppression conditions.
It is very possible this interaction is the effect of articulatory suppression having costs for
memory of color but not for spatial memory. It is also possible that articulatory suppression is differentially effecting the color-only condition and color-and-location condition,
and the design and power in the current experiment to detect this effect. It is possible
with a different design or more subjects, the differences between articulatory suppression
conditions may become significant. Despite the unclear effects of articulatory suppression the difference between color-only and color-and-location conditions was clear. In
Experiment 2A memory capacity in the color-only condition was significantly higher than
memory capacity in the color-and-location condition (t(9) = 4.62, p < 0.001). This effect
replicates Experiment 1 which found that participants are maintaining more color than
color-and-location information in visual working memory. Critically this effect was also
present when participants completed the procedure under articulatory suppression in Experiment 2B: memory capacity in the color-only condition was significantly higher than
memory capacity in the color-and-location condition (t(9) = 3.71, p < 0.01). This result
suggests that suppression does not account for the presence of color information in memory that lacks a location. Moreover, higher performance in between the color-only and the
color-and-location conditions in the unsuppressed condition was not statistically different
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Figure 10. Experiment 2 Results.
Estimated Memory Capacity in each question condition averaged across participants, with error bars to represent standard error.

from the difference in performance in the articulatory suppressed condition (t(16.6) = 1.4,
p = 0.16). That there is more color information than color-and-location information in
both of the articulatory suppression conditions supports the idea that the additional color
information is not being represented verbally.

Discussion
The results of Experiment 2A replicate the Experiment 1: participants maintained about
one more color representation than bound representations of color-and-location. Moreover, the additional color information did not disappear under articulatory suppression.
However, the difference in capacity between color-only condition and color-and-location
condition declined when under suppression. This may imply that articulatory suppression
may not have fully occupied verbal memory. Alternatively this may suggest that the additional color information being held in memory is not being represented verbally and is
instead a free-floating representation.
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The results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that participants hold more color information than color-and-location information in memory. Experiment 2 suggested against the
idea verbal representations as a reason that participants held more color information in
memory, but there are still several possible explanations as to why participants are able
to report more colors than color-and-location conjunctions. In chapter 4 the possibility of
miss-bindings or noise in participants’ memory of locations was responsible for the higher
performance in the color condition than the color-and-location condition.
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CHAPTER IV
FREE-FLOATING FEATURES VS. SPATIAL UNCERTAINTY

In Experiments 1 & 2 participants performed better in the color-only condition than in the
color-and-location condition. It has been shown that in some cases participants misperceive the stimuli, confusing the conjunctive information, and see the stimuli in place of
one another. Confusing one stimuli with another is referred to as a miss-binding. Missbinding is often associated with noise in memory, in which the precision of the location of
a representation is imprecise and allows for a participants to attribute information to the
incorrect locations in the array. The aim of Experiment 3 was to see if the additional color
information found in participants’ memories can be attributed to miss-binding or noise in
memory. To do this, the paradigm was designed in a way that allowed all three question
conditions to use the same whole-report paradigm. In a whole-report paradigm, there is
a study display shown, removed and then a test display is shown; a participant will then
respond if they believe the test display differs from the study display. Implementing a
whole-report paradigm in all three conditions eliminates any possibility that comparing
across models was the cause of the disparity in capacity in which participants held more
color information than color-and-location conjunctive information.
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Experiment 3
There were three four conditions that each required different information top answer correctly. Figure 11 shows an example of a test probe for each of the four conditions. In the
“No Change” condition (Figure 11 A), the same study display is once again presented at
test; to respond correctly to this probe requires knowledge of the color and location of every item in the array (Table 2). In the “Change One” condition one of the colors presented
in the array switched to an external color and otherwise the test array mimicked the study
display (Figure 11 B). This condition requires memory for all of the colors in the array. In
the “Swap Two” conditions two of the colors presented in the study display switched locations but the rest of the display remained uncharged at test (Figure 11 C). This condition
requires memory for all of the colors in the array and their associated location bindings.
In the “Move One” condition one color from the study display moved to one of the locations that was unoccupied in the study display and the other stimuli remained unchanged
(Figure 11 D). This condition requires memory for all of the locations from the array.
If there is perfect binding between color and location, then because the “Swap Two” condition has twice as many changes as the “Change One” condition the, performance in the
“Swap Two” condition should be a predictable amount higher than capacity in the “Change
One” condition. If performance was lower than predicted then this would be considered
evidence that binding occurs less than 100 percent of the time, thus contradicting the
strong-object hypothesis.
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Figure 11. Experiment 3 Probe Conditions.
In the no change condition the unchanged probe identical to the study display.
In the change-one condition, one of the colors was substituted with a color that
was not in the study display. Figure 11B depicts the probe for the “changeone” condition to estimate color memory. In the swap-two condition, two
of the colors from the array swapped display locations. This display tested
participants’ memory for both colors, locations, and the bindings between
these features. In the move-one condition, one of the colors shown in the
study display was moved to a new location in the display. This probe condition
will be known as the move-one condition and tested participants memory for
location alone.

Table 2
Conditions in Experiment 3.
Condition

Requires
Color
(1) No Change X
(2) Change One X
(3) Swap Two X
(4) Move One

Requires
Location
X

Requires
Binding
X

X
X

X

The design of Experiment 3 allows for another critical test. The possibility of missbindings or noise was examined by conducting analysis using distance as a dependent
variable. Distance was ’measured’ by how many positions a color moved. The distance
colors move can be thought of like the number of positions one would move a game piece.
In Figure 11D the blue stimulus has moved one position. In Figure 11C the red and green
stimuli each have moved four positions. If noise in memory or miss-binding to adjacent
stimuli were causing participants to be less accurate than as stimuli are presented further
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from their original location, the number of colors would equal the number of color and
location representations when large moves are made. Free-floating features would be evidenced by more color information than color-and-location information even at large swap
distances. Despite the differences in methodology, the results of the experiments were
expected to replicate Experiments 1 and 2 and find that participants memory is more accurate for colors than color-and-location conjunctions. This Experiment will further provide
a test of whether this effect is due to noise in location memory, or a true absence of location
for some items at study.

Methods
The study consists of colored circles presented around a central fixation point, just as in
Experiments 1 and 2. Then after a one second retention interval a second test display was
shown, and participants were asked whether the test display was the same as the study
display, or differed in any way. By manipulating what changed (color, location or both)
it was possible to estimate participants memory capacity for colors, color-and-location
bindings, and locations.

Participants
Forty-eight participants were recruited from Mississippi State University in exchange for
class credit in a psychology course. Two participants did not finish the task and were
eliminated from analysis. A binomial proportion showed that of the remaining 46 partici-
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pants 40 performed significantly above chance. Only these 40 participants were included
in analysis.

Stimulus and Design
The study displays presented were the same displays used in Experiment 1; these displays
consisted of 6 colored circles presented at 8 possible locations. Following a one second
retention interval, one of four test displays will be presented. Figure 11 shows the four
probe types used in this experiment. Table 2 shows which conditions tapped which types
of information. Half of trials are “No Change” trials. On the other half of the trials,
participants were presented with one of the three other test conditions, “Change One”,
“Swap Two” or “Move one”. In all the conditions participants were to respond whether
they believed the test display was the same as the study display or had changed in any
way. Similar to Experiments 1 & 2, each test condition required a participant to have
different information in memory in order to determine there was a change. The information
required in each condition is depicted in Table 2. Figure 11B, shows one of the colors
was substituted with a color that was not in the study display. To answer correctly in
this condition requires memory of the altered color. Figure 11B depicts the probe for
the “change-one” condition to estimate color memory. Figure 11C shows the swap-two
condition, in which two of the colors from the array swapped display locations. This
display tested participants’ memory for both colors, locations, and the bindings between
these features requiring participants to hold the binding for at least one of the two colors
swapping places. In Figure 11D, one of the colors shown in the study display was moved
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to a new location in the display, and required participants know which six locations in the
study display were used to show colors. This probe condition will be known as the moveone condition and tested participants memory for location alone. They were instructed to
respond “change” if anything differed from the study array.

Procedure
The procedure was similar to the procedure used in the previous experiments. Each trial
started with a fixation cross, followed by a display of six colored circles shown for 500 ms.
Following the study period, the stimuli would be removed from the screen, and there was
then a 1000 ms retention interval. However, unlike in previous experiments, the retention
interval was followed by the presentation of a second test display. The presentation of this
second test display prompted participants to respond whether the display on the screen
matched their display at study.

Results
Two separate approaches were used to analyze the data. I first present the classic wholereport approach and then a novel joint-feature model.

Fitting Each condition separately
The model bottom of Figure 5 was fit to each condition. One important feature of the
model is that when there was not a change in the array, participants must guess. In order
to know whether anything has changed a participant must know all of the features of the
array. This is similar to the color-only conditions in Experiments 1 and 2.
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The application of the whole-report model to each condition independently provides estimates of memory capacity for each condition. If color-and-location binding is always
present, then performance in the change-one condition (measuring memory of color) should
be lower than performance in the swap-two condition (measuring memory of color-andlocation bindings). To make this comparison between the number of colors and color-andlocation bindings,compare the performance in the swap-two condition with the predicted
performance when there is perfect binding based on performance in the change-one condition. If there is perfect binding, as predicted by the strong-object hypothesis, then performance in the swap-two condition can be predicted based on their performance in the
change-one condition. If the color is always bound to space, then swapping the location of
two stimuli should elicit the same as performance in a hypothetical condition where two
colors would change to external colors. In the swap-two condition a participant has two
opportunities to encode information that will help them recognize the change in the display. If participants have the same probability of recalling either item there are three ways
to receive a hit; the first target can be recalled, the second target can be recalled , or both
targets can be recalled. Therefore performance in the swap-two condition if participants
have perfect binding is calculated much like a hit but as the probability that participants
would have either of the target change items minus the possibility that participants have
both of the target items


SwapT wo = 2 ∗ ChangeOne − ChangeOne ∗
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ChangeOne − 1
N −1


(13)

For example, if participants get three of six items in the change-one condition; they should
get five out of six of the items in a condition with two changes if they have perfect binding.
If color-and-location are not always bound than performance in the swap-two condition
will not reach the predicted performance based on the swap-two conditions. The predicted
performance in this experiment is shown as the central point in Figure 12. The bars here
represent the estimated capacity in each of the conditions.
A t-test indicated indicated that performance in the swap-two is much less than would be
predicted if there was perfect binding (t(41) = 16.61, p < 0.001) (Figure 12).Moreover, capacity was similar in the change-one color-based and swap-two binding-based conditions
(t(41) = 0.24, p > 0.08). These results suggest that color information is not always bound
to space, providing evidence in opposition to the strong-object hypothesis.
To address the possibility that spatial uncertainty was artificially suppressing estimates of
participants’ memory capacity, the data were analyzed using distance swapped as a dependant measure. The nature of presenting stimuli around an invisible circles means that
no stimuli could be more than four places or 180◦ away from another stimulus. Another
way to think about this movement is similar to pieces of a game-board. The number of
positions you move your colored game piece around the locations on the ’board’ corresponds to the distance swapped. Noise and miss-bindings in spatial memory should make
performance worse at smaller distances. The larger the distance swapped the less chance
that spatial uncertainty, caused by miss-bindings or noise in memory, would interfere with
a participant being able to detect the change.
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Figure 12. Experiment 3 Results Using the whole-report Model.
Estimated Memory Capacity in Experiment 3 as defined by the whole-report
model with error bars to represent standard error.

Joint Feature Analysis
There is evidence that binding was not perfect to quantitatively estimate how often participants do and do not hold a correctly bound representation in their head, a joint feature
model was designed to estimate the rate of color-and-location binding in this task. This
model is illustrated in Figure 14. The joint feature model is itself a whole-report model.
However, all of the probe conditions are fit simultaneously with this model.
In the no change condition (Figure 14 A), for a participant not to guess they would have to
recall all six colors, all six locations, and the six bindings between them. Because this is far
to much information to recall, participants cannot know if the test stimuli not in memory
50

5
4
3
2

●

1

●

0

Total Memory Capacity

●
●

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Number of Positions Swapped

Figure 13. Experiment 3 Results Applying the whole-report Model by Swap Distance.
Estimated Memory Capacity in Experiment 3 at each swap distance compared
to the predicted performance in the swap-two condition with error bars to
represent standard error.

match the stimuli shown in the study array. This lack of concrete knowledge about the
stimuli not in memory forces a participant guess whether or not these stimuli have changed
between study and test. In the change-one condition (Figure 14 C) participants could get
a hit by correctly recalling the bound object information correctly (b1), correctly recalling
the unbound color information (c); if they failed to recall this information they could guess
getting a hit or a miss. The swap-two condition (Figure 14 B) requires that participants
have either of the two bindings of the swapped colors (b2). If participants know one or
both of the bindings and recognizes the change they would get a hit. In the move-one
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Figure 14. The Joint Feature Model.
A depiction of the joint feature model created to estimate the rate of colorand-location binding in this task. In the No Change condition (Figure 14 A)
participants could either recall there was no change and get a correct rejection
or guess getting either a correct rejection or a false alarm. In the Swap-Two
condition (depicted in Figure 14 B) participants could either recall information
to reject the array and know there was change getting a hit or guess getting
either a hit or a miss. In the Change-One condition (Figure 14 C) participants
could either recall information to reject the array and know there was change
getting a hit or guess getting either a hit or a miss. In the Move-One condition
(Figure 14 D) participants could either recall information to reject the array
and know there was change getting a hit or guess getting either a hit or a miss.

condition (Figure 14 D), participants could get a hit by correctly recalling the binding
correctly (b1), or correctly recalling the spatial locations from the study array (l).
The joint feature model makes predicted hit and false alarm rates for each condition. Using
maximum likelihood estimation and the Nelder-Mead algorithm (Nelder & Mead, 1965)
the parameters (c, b, l, &g) were estimated for each participant.

FA = g
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Figure 15. Experiment 3 Results from the Joint Feature Model.
Estimated Memory Capacity in Experiment 3 as determined by the joint feature model. The left most bar labeled unbound colors represents the parameter
c ∗ 6. The center bar labeled bound objects represents the parameter b ∗ 6. The
right most bar labeled unbound locations represents the parameter l ∗ 6. The
error bars represent standard error.



N.stim ∗ b − 1
H.b = 2b − b ∗
N.stim − 1






N.stim ∗ b − 1
+ g ∗ 1 − 2b − b ∗
N.stim − 1

(15)

H.c = b + (1 − b) ∗ c + (1 − b) ∗ (1 − c) ∗ g

(16)

H.l = b + (1 − b) ∗ l + (1 − b) ∗ (1 − l) ∗ g

(17)

The parameter b1 was estimated as (M = 0.204, SD = 0.083). This means that participants
maintained a correctly bound representation of about 20% of the stimuli. Participants
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capacity for bound representations can then be calculated as the likelihood that a representation was to be recalled times the number of representations. For example in this case
20% of 6 is 1.2 bound color-and-location conjunction representations, which matches approximately the capacity illustrated in Figure 15. The same calculations can be performed
with the remaining parameters. l was estimated as (M = 0.791, SD = 0.235), indicating
unbound location was recalled a further 80% percent of the time. This gave participants
an average capacity of just under 5 unbound locations, matching what is seen in Figure 15.
Furthermore, c was estimated as (M = 0.235, SD = 0.168), signifying that participants had
the color without discernible spatial information about 23% of the time, leaving participants with a capacity of just under one and a half unbound colors. These results replicate
those from Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that people hold about one color without the
associated location information.
The joint feature model was also fit to four subsets of the data divided by swap distance
(Figure 16). Fitting the model by swap-distance replicated the findings of the whole-report
model. As the swap distance increases, there is some decline in the number of unbound
colors. This decline in the number of unbound colors indicates there is some noise in
memory. However, even when stimuli are moved to the other side of the screen, participants’ capacity for unbound colors did not decrease below one. This result is evidence
that there is a free-floating color representation in memory, even after noise and spatial
uncertainty are accounted for.
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Figure 16. Experiment 3 Results in Joint Feature Model by Swap Distance.
Estimated Memory Capacity in Experiment 3 broken down by swap distance,
determined by the joint feature model. Error bars represent standard error.

Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 replicated the two previous experiments: participants held
color information in memory that was not bound to a location. In Experiment 3 the same
model was used in all of the question conditions eliminating the modeling as a possible
explanation for the results in Experiments 1 and 2 that there was more color than bound
color-and-location conjunction information in working memory.
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When the data are analyzed as a function of swap distance performance in the swap-two
condition did not reach the level of predicted performance that should have occurred had
there been perfect binding even when swapped 180◦ . Additionally, the joint feature model
replicated this result. While there was some decline in the number of unbound colors
estimated at greater swap distances, there is evidence of approximately one completely
unbound color in memory. Therefore, there is evidence that both noise or miss-bindings
in location and a free-floating feature.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Our conscious visual perception of the world seems to be comprised of objects. We do
not see groupings of lines and colors; we simply see blue pens and white coffee cups.
This restructuring of the representation of our world is a function of perception, and the
information that results from perception is stored in visual working memory.
Visual working memory can hold information for short periods of time and is where information is manipulated. That information in visual working memory seems to be perceived
at the object level but manipulable on a feature level. An everyday example of manipulating an item on a feature level occurs when you see an article of clothing online. You are
capable of imagining what that article of clothing may look like in different colors even
before clicking to see the other colors it is produced in. The contrast between our perception and the manipulability of representations raises the question how information is
stored in visual working memory. The possible theories of how information is represented
in visual working memory fall on a continuum. There are two extremes; the strong-object
hypothesis says that all of the features of an object are automatically bound together; the
other extreme is that features are represented independently, with no bindings for objects.
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This “strong-feature” theory proposed that only the number of features mattered and the
number of objects the features were segmented into had no effect on people’s memory
capacity.
Several studies support the idea of feature-based representations (Fougnie & Alvarez,
2011; Fougnie et al., 2013; Logie et al., 2011; Rajsic & Wilson, 2014; Saiki & Miyatsuji, 2007; Xu & Chun, 2006) and several other studies support the the idea of object
based representations (Awh et al., 2007; Foster et al., 2017; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Schneegans & Bays, 2016). There is good evidence for both the strong-object hypothesis and the
weak-object hypothesis, however, something too often overlooked in these studies is the
influence of spatial location.
On the other end of the spectrum is the possibility that representations are maintained
at the object-level. These representations would include all the features of an object, is
referred to as the strong-object hypothesis (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Theories such as the
strong-object hypothesis suggest that if a single feature of a stimulus is remembered, then
all of the features of stimuli should be contained in the same visual working memory
representation. Maintaining a single representation including all of the features of an
object are automatically bound together in memory: If you ’get’ one feature of an object
into memory, you have them all. For example, if you were shown Figure 2 and then it was
taken away, if you remembered that the line on the right of the display was blue, then you
would also always know that it was horizontal.

58

Feature Integration Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) proposes a more moderate possibility. In Feature Integration Theory, representations are comprised of features that are
encoded into working memory as they are perceived, but bindings between features are
only encoded if the stimuli is within the ’spotlight of attention.’ This theory was proposed
over three decades ago and makes similar predictions to more modern theories of the structure of visual working memory representations (Olson & Jiang, 2002), which propose the
idea that features are represented independently in visual working memory. If features are
maintained separately it is possible that some attention based process like chunking within
and across objects works so that the different features of an object take fewer resources to
be maintained. This idea is the weak-object hypothesis and designates that if one feature
of an object is known, the other features of that object may or may not be represented in
visual working memory. The weak-object hypothesis suggests that if you know there was
a blue line in a display such as in Figure 2, then you are likely to but may not have any
memory that the blue line was horizontal, or that it was located on the right of the array.
Treisman and Gelade (1980) put forth the idea that features can be perceived independently, but the bindings between features can only be perceived under the spotlight of spatial attention. A later study showed that using displays that facilitated the focus of spatial
location (Kahneman & Treisman, 1992). When spatial attention was focused by location
or shared movement there was a advantage in the memory of bound objects which implies
that spatial attention is crucial to the binding process. There is decades of evidence indicating that there is something special about how location is treated in the binding process.
Despite the unique role space plays in binding an underwhelming number of studies that
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have investigated the relationship between peoples’ memory for features and their memory for the those features’ association with the location at which they were presented. To
investigate how features bind to space, in the current study, people were required to recall
how many colors, color-and-location conjunctions, and locations that they could retrieve
from memory. The goal was to test if it was possible to maintain identify information like
colors without the associated location information.
The aim of Experiment 1 was to evaluate the possibility of maintaining colors not bound
to a location. The approach was to test if people can hold equal amounts of color information as bound color-and-location information. The strong-object hypothesis would predict
that people maintain an equal amount of color and bound color-and-location information.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that people can retrieve four colors, but only three colors with
the associated location bindings.
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the source of the location-less color information is
verbal memory. This experiment was designed to test if participants upon seeing a red
item encoded “red” into verbal memory and this verbal representation is the source of the
additional capacity seen in the color-only condition. Participants’ ability to use verbal
memory was restricted but may not have been eliminated by having subjects complete the
procedure while completing a second task. While completing the memory task participants
were asked to repeat “ta-da” throughout the procedure, known as articulatory suppression.
While articulatory suppression was implemented, there was still more color information
than color-and-location information. The presence of additional color information not
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bound to a location, even when completing the task under suppression, demonstrates that
the additional color information without a location may not be to a verbal representation
of that color.
Although Experiment 2 showed that the additional color information held in memory could
may not be a verbal representation, there are other possible explanations that do not imply a free-floating feature. Experiment 3 aimed to investigate whether noise in spatial
memory rather than a free-floating representation caused participants to have artificially
low estimates of capacity in the bound condition. One condition of Experiment 3 used
the distance between stimuli in the swap-two and move-one conditions as a dependant
variable. If a stimuli moved to one of the other seven positions in the array it had the
opportunity to move four distances; from to an adjacent position to clear across the screen.
If noise in memory for location is causing people to recall more color information than
color-and-location information, then when the when location changes are very large, then
there should be equal amounts of color and color-and-location information in visual working memory. However, people did not reach predicted performance even when noise was
minimized by moving stimuli large distances. This result is evidence against the possibility that noise in location memory was causing the disparity between the color condition
and color-and-location condition. The fact that a people retrieved color information which
could not be accounted for in the most distinct spatially-bound condition implies that there
is one color in memory that does not just have a noisy spatial location it is free-floating.
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Previous investigations often use partial report paradigms, in which a location or a single
stimulus is cued and prompts people to respond with their memory of the stimulus color
at that particular location. The results of the current series of experiments implies that
the partial report design poses an issue in cases in which a participant has remembered
the color but has not bound the target stimulus to the probed location. The locationcued, partial-report task, is the laboratory equivalent of forgetting where you just set your
cellphone down. You know what you are looking for and that you just saw it, but you do
not have the associated location information that would allow you to retrieve your desired
outcome. In these cases, even if people know the feature information, an experimenter
is probing for without the associated location-based cue, the participant does not have a
way to retrieve the desired information from memory. If the strong-object hypothesis is
correct, then cuing people with location is of no consequence because if a participant has
a memory for the target color, then they must also have the necessary binding. However,
if the weak-object hypothesis is correct, the necessity of binding color to location would
imply that these studies are measuring something other than what they set out to measure.
The findings of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 have possibility to shed light on shortfalls in our
of this task. Because a location-based probe requires the memory of the binding between a
feature and the location, this binding may or may not be in memory; on a portion of trials,
people will be unable to respond in the same manner as if they did have the binding.
While partial report tasks can be used to measure memory of joint color-and-location
representations, there is more information present in memory that these studies are missing
in their estimates.
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In visual working memory tasks items are often probed for their color. People often report
non-target colors in place of target colors (Bays et al., 2009). When people report an item
other than the probed item, it is often referred to as a swap error (Bays, 2016). There
has been much speculation as to what exactly swap-errors are, but if Feature Integration
Theory (Treisman and Gelade, 1980) provides one explanation. In Treisman and Gelade
(1980), it is proposed that people use the limited spotlight of spatial attention to bind
together and store bound representations of the features of an object. However, according
to Feature Integration Theory, we additionally encode representations of features without
binding into separate feature-based stores. These separate stores, known as feature maps,
are capable of maintaining representations of single features such as color or shape. When
people are asked for information about something they have seen, they can use both their
knowledge of the bound representations and their knowledge of features from their feature
maps. When in a task where they are asked about a what color was at a single location
in a display, a participant may not have the information required in their bound memory.
Without knowledge of the answer, a participant is forced to make an informed guess using
information in the feature maps. The guessing strategy used by participants could lead to
data patterns that would imitate the “swapping” of object identities and locations in visual
working memory, but would be the result of a guessing strategy displayed by people when
their memory falls short.
In conclusion, these experiments demonstrate that people can retrieve more color information than bound color-and-location information. The additional color information available
in memory is may not be a verbal memory and is also is not fully accounted for by noise
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in memory. This extra color information is free-floating, not bound to any location. These
findings conflict with the predictions of the strong-object hypothesis but do not contradict
other theories, including the weak-object hypothesis and Feature integration theory.
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